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Small Enterprises and the Crisis in Indian Development 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA claims that it has supportedthe 
development ofsmall enterprises, both through the creation of specific 
organisations which provide technical and organisational id and 
through financial provisions for them in the various five year plans. To 
understand fully the basis and accuracy of these claims, it is important 
to appreciate the economic aud political background within which the 
Government's aid programmes were initiated. This will also allow us 
to understand the genesis of the Government's conception of small 
enterprises. 
It is a widely held view that planning in India consists essentially 
of five year plans, which are in the nature of technical exercises. In fact, 
the planning process hould correctly be seen as a much broader and 
as an emphatically political process.1 The crucial aspect of the nature 
of planning in India lies in the concept of the capitalist economy, in 
which the laws of capitalist development must inevitably make them- 
selves felt (i e, the acceptance of private property in the means of 
production a d the institutions based on this). It is often stated not 
only in government publications but in many other writings on the 
Indian economy and society that India has "opted" for a mixed 
economy, i e, the coexistence of the private sector with the publc sector.2 
It is not made clear by these writers, however, by whom and how this 
type of economy was "opted" for. 
In fact, it had been shown that as early as 1940, the majority of 
the joint stock companies operating in India were in the hands of a few 
British and Indian managing agency houses.3 It was these powerful 
economic interests hat effectively controlled the industrial economy of 
India. During the Second World War, Indian irldustrialists were able 
to accumulate substantial mounts of capital. This was used in the 
years leading upto Independence to buy out some British managing 
agencies. By the time of Independence, therefore, 121 identifiable arge 
economic interests, including 69 Indian groups (later to become famous 
as the "Big Business Groups") controlled Rs 350 crores of paid up 
capital.4 This amounted to about 73 per cent of the total paid up capital 
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in India at that time. Although there were, of course, many more corZ 
porate enterprises apparently independent of these powerful economic 
interests, their average size would not have been more than Rs 7 lakhs 
in terms of paid up capital.S 
The point to be emphasised, therefo,e. is that while independance 
meant the transfer of "political" power to the Congress, it also meAnt 
the transfer of "economic" power to the big Indian indrlstrialists and 
agricultural landlords.6 It is important o remember that while 30me 
of these industrialists had played a prominent role, directly or indirectly, 
in the national movement, they constituted the oligarchic bloc in plan- 
ning bodies.7 It is thus unlikely that any other than a "mixed?' pattern 
of economy could have been "opted" for, given thb high degree of 
concentration of industrial assets in private llarlds, and the decision 
making power flowing from this.8 On the other hand, public enterprises 
in areas involving high risks and long gestation periods were required 
for the growth of enterprises controlled by large industrialists. Popular 
sentiment in favour of the public sector gexlerated uring pre-Independ- 
ence debates was skilfully used to justify investments in such strategic 
industries .9
Encouragement to Small Enterprises 
'rhere was a socio-political as well as economic imperative for 
the conscious encouragement of snlall enterprises. 
The high degree of concentration of capital in the Indian eco- 
nomy at the time of lndependence led to a serious ituation as far as the 
stability of the existing social order was concerned. Property distribu- 
tion in India was, as figures for capital concentration show, extremely 
skewed, with only a minute fraction of the Irldian population in osvner- 
ship of industrial assets. Added to this was a situation where the country 
had achieved independence under the pressure of a mass national 
movement. Although never seriously challenging the legitimacy of 
institutions of private property, this had generated and disseminated 
democratic ideas. viewing unfavourably the existence of extreme con- 
centrations of income and wealth.10 For the continuance and further 
development of the capitalist social order bequeathed by British coloni- 
alism to the leader3 of the Congress-the rnajor organi.sed corlstituent 
of the national movement-it ssas essential, if IlOt to <listribute existing 
industrial and agricultural assets, at least to encourage the growtll of 
nulnerous maller property holders. l l 
The economic imperative facing the planners arcsc from tile high 
degree of self-employment in the economy. According to the 19o1 
population census, over 58 per cent of the ssulk force engaged in indus- 
try "neither emplofred any one nor did they u-ork for anyone".12 If thc 
mass of productive facilities already existing at tlle tiIne of independ- 
encc werc to expand and grow, it was critical that the market for the 
gocuds which they produced should also grow. The good3 produced in 
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industrial establishments can be broadly classified into (1) those which 
are consumed directly; (2) those that are used in the manufacture of 
other articles (intermediate goods); and (3) the capital goods on which 
all these articles are manufactured. It is one of the laws of the develop- 
ment of economy that the market for irltermediate goods and capital 
goods must increase at a faster rate than the market for consumer 
goods.13 TO generate a fast growing market for capital goods and 
intermeliate goods, it was necessary for tlle planners to encollrage a
process of capital accumulation, leading to difTerentiation among the 
huge mass of self-errlployed persons. 
Under the lass7s of capitalist competition, a sm<all minority of these 
self-employed persons was to be expected to develop into a stratum (f 
relatively small industrial entreprenours. The large majority would 
inevitably lose the little property they held, and enter the work force as 
wage workers. Processes in the agricultural sector similar to that of 
diSerentiation of the self-employed industrial workers described above 
were expected to take place simultaneously.:4 Thus, both the socio- 
political irnperative of the development of a small industrial capitalist 
stratum, and the economic imperative of the encouragement of small 
industrial enterprises pointed to the need for a set of official policy 
measures and institutions which would aid these processes. Both these 
requirements of capitali st economic development flowed out of the 
condition of the Indian economy at tiIne. \Shat is of interest in 
the Indian case, however, is that these requirements collld be skillfully 
matched to the popular support for small industrialists and small enter- 
prises which had been generated by democratic currents within the 
Congress itself in tile pre-Independence period. Right wing and left 
wing elements within the Congress had debated the roles of the private 
and the public sectors, of large and small enterprises, and the content 
of post-Indeperldence conomic planning in the pre-Independence 
period . l s 
As a result of immediate post-lnclependence ont.roversies, how- 
ever, the plans of the left wing in the Congress for natioalisation of all 
large enterprises were diluted to measures for governmental regulation16 
of initiation, expansion, and change of location c)f large industrial 
enterprises. the last named for the purpose of avoiding geographical 
coneentration of industrial development. 'lEhe 1951 Industrial Develop- 
ment and Regulation Act (IDRA) whiszll was, and is, the chief admini- 
strative instrument of industrial planners, defined the size of the 
enterprise which wotlld come under its purview, and also defined (by 
exclusion) enterprises which would be free of such legulations. This 
eselllded sector came to be known officially as modern small enterprise 
sector. 
Tn 1954, tlie office of the Development Commissioner, Small Scale 
Industries, svas estlblished in the Ministry of Industry in Delhi as 
the admirlistratie agency resporlsible for planning and rnonitoring 
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programmes for the developnaent of small enterprises. In 1955, the 
National Small Industries Corporation was established to look after 
commercial prograrnmes (such as the supply of machinery on hire- 
purchase, and the development of marketing channels) for small 
enterprises. In the subsequent years, each of tile State Governments 
established its own corporation to develop small enteprises, in addition 
to the State Financial Corporations which provided financial asbsistance 
to small and medium enterprises. 
At the present ime, tile governmerlt defines a small enterprise as 
one in which the cost to the owner of the plant and machinery installed 
is less than Rs 20 lakhs. In fact, from 1960, the Government has been 
deEning small enterprises solely on the basis of the value of ISxed capital, 
and later, in plant and equipment. Ostensibly because of the rising 
costs of plant arld machinery due to inflation, the defining limit has 
been raised from time to time. This definition refers to what are known 
as modern small enterprises which can be found on the outskirts of most 
large cities, or on industrial estates. In addition, there are enterprises 
involved in handloom weaving, khadi, and some other traditional village 
occupations, which should also form part of a discussion of small enter- 
prises. 
Concentration a d Centralisation 
'The institutions for the development of small enterprises which 
have been described are, therefore, the results of the economic and 
political requirements of a capitalist development strategy based on 
direct administrative intervention, on the one hand, and also the 
reflection of the democratic currents within the nationalist movement 
led by big capitalists, on the other. These institutions operate within 
the context of an economy subject to the laws of capatalist development, 
and it is to the eSects of these laws that nve now turn. 
It has earlier been pointed out that under the pressure of capita- 
list competition, a process of diSerentiation takes place amongst the 
mass of small producers, leading to the emergence of a small propertied 
stratum and a large mass of wage workers. This process of dispossession 
on the one hand, and of property accumulation on the other, is an 
intrinsic part of the process of capitalist accumulation, or concentration, 
in the early stages of capitalist development. Simultaneously with this 
process of concentration of individual capitals, there is another process 
known as centralisation.l7 This process is commonly observed in the 
form of merger of pre-existing enterprises, and involves the coming 
together of capitals already in existence. Larger and larger pools of 
capital are formed very swiftly by the process oc centralisation which 
takes place particularly rapidly during periods of economic crisis when 
capitalist enterplises are "ratiollalised" or zveeded out. 
The stock exchanges in the country serve as another important 
means of centralisation; thes help to pool capital held in various froms 
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and even the savings of middle class sections of society, which 
are then 
utilised by the controllers of large joint stock companies. 
Under the pressure of capitalist competition and the laws 
of 
concentration and centralisation, an enterprise must either grow 
in size 
continuously, or collapse sooner c)r later. Tt cannot remain 
stagnant 
in size. As the centralisation of capital increases, there is less 
and less 
rooin within the economy for new capitalist interests to operate. 
The 
restllt is that most of the small enterprises will fail to ISnd a 
permanent 
place for themselves in the economy, and will be forszed out of 
business 
sooner or later. 
However, there can occasionally be short lived exceptions to this 
general rule. In the years following Independen(:e, the shortage 
of 
foreign exchange led to restrictions on imports. In addition, encouraged 
by the brief thrust of the second five year plan strategy of self-reliant 
growth, many small enterprises did develop to fill in the gap 
left by 
import estrictions. Production of some articles of every day 
use such 
as kitchen utensils, cutlery, fountain pens, and plasticware 
began in 
small enterprises. Continuing demand for these products 
led to the 
growth of a certain number of these small enterprises. 
Economic Logic and Crisis of Small Enterprises 
Predictably, by the beginning of the third five year plan, and 
particularly after the eccBnomic crisis of the middle 1960s, the 
prospects 
for small enterprises have been increasingly unfavourable. 
Partly as a 
reslllt of the inability to find "space" for new small enterprises 
in the 
economy, and partly as a result of mecting the pressure from 
big indus- 
trialists (which we shall discuss later), the Government has 
from the 
time of the third five year plan (1961-66) put some emphasis 
on the 
development of ancillaries amongst small enterprises.18 They 
were 
expected to survive on the basis of assured markets mainly provided 
by 
large enterprises. 
The question that arises is how assured these markets really are 
Broadly speaking, a small enterprise can undertake three kinds 
of work, 
It may operate purely a.s a subcontractor on raw materials provided 
by 
the customer; it may manufacture an item to the long or short 
term 
order of another (usually larger) enterprise; or it may manufacture 
the 
item for direct sale on the market. Generally, both the subcontracting 
enterprises and those making a product o the order of other enterprises 
are known as ancillaries. In these cases, it can be seexl that 
the small 
enterprise has no separate economic existence. It merely embodies 
a 
segment of the prodllction process which has been separated 
from and 
apparerltly under the controI of the large enterprise. lhe absence 
of 
possitJilities of independent existence of these ancillary units 
makes 
them subject to a variety of pressures by their large customers. 
Parti- 
cularly at tiales oI recession in the cconomy, involvinga credit 
squeeze, 
the larber ellterprises attempt o improve their cash flow position 
by 
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delaying payments. CCut hroat competition between competing ancill- 
aries drives the price of the goods often to the level of prixne cost of 
production. The general existence of such conditions creates relation- 
ships of further dependence of the small entrepreneur onhis big customer 
The situation is little, if at a11, better for small enterprises maliing 
Snal products for the market. In the majoritv of cases, these enterprises 
face extreme competition from estalJlished 3arge enterprises under the 
control of transnational monopolies and indigenous lDig business 
groups .1 9 
It must be noted that tIaere .lre no economies of large scale 
production to be gained (e g, in tlae case of msltches5 toothpaste7 and 
many other items) where the branded prodx( ts of transnatio1lal alld big 
Indian enterprises are hou.sellold words. TIlese large enterprises retain 
their dominant position by their control over raw material supplies, and 
especially by the enormous resources invesled in the distrlbution and 
"maI keting" networks extending even to the most remote village 
retailer.20 It must be emphasised, therefole, that the large si7:e of 
these enterprises, and the very high rates of profit which they earn, are 
a resuIt of their monopolistic position, and in no sense an indication of 
their efficiency ofoperation. .N fraction of tllese profits are passed onto 
the "sole" retailers in the fortn of high discotlnts, thlls ensul-illg that 
competingproductsofsrtlall e terprises, eveniftheyare cheaper, find 
few outlets.2t 
The fact that large foreign arAd indigenous indust..rial i lterests 
earn high profits by their operation, does not lneKln at all that tlley have 
no interest in the smaIl enterprises field. As an unregulated sector, 
the small enterprises fieId allow them, tlough the development of 
benami ancillaries, to increase the capacity of their large enterprises 
beyond that licensed to them under IDRA. Tilev are able to make use 
of the credit extended by the nationalised banks, under conditions 
where banks are eager to achiexZe bank lending norms to the "priority 
sector" of which small enterprises form a component. They can provide 
comfortalJle jobs to members of tile extended families (which fortn the 
sociological core of the big business groups) and provide patronage to 
loyal ex-employees .2 2 
T11us it is clear that tSle issue of aid to the ss11tt11 entreprez1eur 
lerslls aicl to thessnall enterprise is crucial both to the continuance of the 
progrssxlzne a7Z{ foz the correct adentification oJ beneficiaries. 
Struggle for Survival 
This intiltration of the small enterprise prorarnlne by established 
interests is an expre3sion of the clash between tzxro forces: the oligarchic 
one3 (desiring merely the extension of the capitalist market for the 
means of prodllction through the creation of smsll enterprises) and the 
democratic onesdbsiiitlg the safebuard of the.r income earning oppor- 




There have been a number of situations in the past which have 
shown attempts by oligarchic and dernocratic forces to gain control of 
the programme. Prominent amongst the democratic currents was the 
appointment of the A R Bhat Committee to formulate legislation in 
support of the small enterprises programrne.23 lwhe small entrepreneur 
merrlbers of the committee suggested that a small entreprise be 
defined in relationship to the size of the total capital owned by an 
interest in all the enterprises corltrolled by it. In otherwords, they 
sought o remove the phenolnenon of multiple ownership of small enter- 
prises, and ty extension, the owership Of such enterprises by large 
indv1strial nterests. 
There was determined opposition to this from the majority of 
the commiLtee drawn from the administration, and from among pro- 
fessional chartered accountants, both of whom represented big capitalist 
interests. Under the circumstances, the chairman himself (who, it must 
be noted, was not an entrepreneur himself, big or small) and the 
minority of the comxllittee presellted this suggestion in the form of 
a rninute of dissent to the main report. 
However, it is clear that the conteIlt of the legislation proposed 
in the main report potentially jeopardised big industrial interests. 
Althougll the report was submitted to the Government of India in 1972, 
st is still oHicially "under consideration". This incident illustrates the 
temporary assertion by democratic interests, expressed in the very 
formation of the Comtnittee and in some of its recommendations. On 
the other handX the Government's silence oil the issue since 1972 shows 
the long term triumph of big industrial interests. 
On another occasion, the democratic forces ensured that the 
officialdefinitionof therelationship betweenanancillary unit andits 
large customer made it explicitly clear that the contract between the 
two was to be fair to both parties.24 However, this was an unrealistic 
expectation, given the present day circumstance. Through the expedient 
of refusing to acknowledge enterprises which were in fact serving as 
their ancillaries, t}1e atlenlpt of the democratic forces, thQugh worth 
nothing, was sidetracked. 
Finally, me1ltioil rnay be madeof arecent move to modify 1DRA 
in order to bring the concept of reservation of itemes for exclusive 
production by small enterprises onto a 1)asis acceptable to the courts.25 
This follows a decision of the Bornbay High Court which held that the 
administrative order reserving items could IlOt be sustained under legal 
scrutiny.26 rrhese are all exarnples of attempts by delnocratic forces to 
strengthen the srnall cllterpl ises developnsent programt.ne in the interest 
of the small entrepreneur. 
On the olller hand, large industrial interests have attempted by 
all possible means to ensure that the government programme, as an 
institutiont contirlues to serve their long term interests. They, however, 
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thwart he operalion of the provisions which assist small individual 
entrepreneurs todevelop into a competing body, or a stratum independ- 
dent of them. It is precisely this opposition that manifests big capitalist 
domination responsible for the collapse of many small enterprises. 
Apart frotn the so-called modern small enterprises, there are 
two other kinds of stnall enterprises rhich require consideration. The 
first of these consists of enterprises in the textile industry using hand- 
looms and powerlooms. These enterprises which are concentrated 
specifica]ly in blalaarashtra and ramil N^ldu, are peculiar in that they 
represent productiorl processes of a traditional nalure which have been 
modified selectil.ely. They are major providers of employment, parti- 
cularl irl Talmil Nadll and their products need to be protected from 
the competition of the products of the large scale integrated textile 
enterpri ses .
The second kind of small enterprises which, in general, is more 
of a traditional techrlological nature lies under the purviess of the Khadi 
and Village Industries (::ommission (KVIC). In its search to generate 
incomeearning opportunities on a large scale in the rural areas, the 
Commission's activilies are particularly important in drawing womcn of 
the Scheduled Castes into regular paid employment. Althowlgh t e KVIC 
has managed, through its programme, to cover a negligible fraction of 
these sections, its scileme for the collection of indigenous seeds, for 
example, constitlltes fforts worthy of much greater public support. Here 
again, the prograrllmes are not likely to make a headway unless the 
activities of large {oreign and indigenously owned enterprises are 
eSectively curbed.27 
Conclusion 
Small entrepreneurs are aware that they are in a situation in 
which the logic of an economy dominated by large industrial interests 
provides them with little room to survive, let alone grow.28 tn addition, 
they are subject to harrassment at the hands of the agencies of the 
government as frequently as an ordinary citizen. The link or collusion 
of interests between big industrialists and government agencies is at 
once apparent o the small enterpreneur. He can see the diSerential 
treatment accorded to big industrialists on the one hand, and to himself 
on the other, even when the same rules apply to both. As their xTcry 
survival is at stake, the sz1all entrepreneur stratum is vitally interested 
in the renloval of the domination of large industrial interests as it 
exists today. 
Specific measures such as excise reductions on the products of 
small enterprises and effective reservation of items for production 
exclusively in small enlerprises, can ease the burden of the small entre- 
preneur. However, a crucial step is to ensllre that only the deserving 
benefits frorn these concessions, that is, to zveed out the real from the 
benami small entrepreneur.29 The associations of small enterprises are 
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currently the hotbeds oScorruption and political opportunism. However, 
they do form, in an embryonic manner, the vehicles of policing the 
ssnall e.nterprises development programme generally. They may also 
serve as an appropriate channel for conducting a dialogue between 
small entrepreneurs and other sections of society Eghting for demo- 
cratic advance. 
Without implicating themin any way, I am gratefill to SCiskore Theckedath, and to Meena 
Radhakrishan for their comments onthe formulations i  an carlier draft. 
1 This is very cleatly elaborated by E M S l!;amboodripad in his Indian Plarlningin 
Crisis, Triv<andrum, Chintha Publishers, l974. See especially pp 24-25. 
2 Xhirokov, for instance, talks in non-class and mystical terms of "Irldia's conception 
of industrialisation". See G K Shirokov, lndustrialisation f InuSia, Moscow, 
Progress Publishers, 197S, p 10. 
3 Wadia and Merchant describe the situation on the basis of figures provided in 
Asoka Mehta's pamphlets. See P A Wadia and K T Merchant, Our Economis 
Problems, Bombay, New Book Co, 1943. 
4 G K Shirokov, op cit, p 49. 
5 The paid up capital of all joint stock companies in India was Rs 479.5 crores 
(number 21,8.z3) on 31 Ma.rch 1947, and Rs 569.6 crores (number 22,675) on 31 
March 1948. If we ta.ke the 1947 figure and assume that each of the 121 groups 
controlled 50 companies on the average, then the average size of the remaining 
companies can be obtained by simple arithmetic. For the data see, R K Nigam 
and N C Chaudhuril The Corporate Scstor in India: A Factual Presentation f Long and 
Short Term Trends, New lDelhi, Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Department of Company Law Administration, Research and Statistics 
Division, 196 1. 
6 Sardar Vallabhai Patel was (together with Bhulabhai Desai) specifically mentioned 
by G D Birla as one who was "fighting against socialism". In turn, Patel 
commended the first finance minister, Shanmukham Chetty, to business leaders as 
"one of their own". Ixl fact, until Patel's death in 1950, both the finance and 
industry ministries functioned under his control. 
G D Birla's commendation (in a letter to Walchand Hirachand) is quoted in 
R K Ray, IndustrialisaZion in India, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1979, p 326. 
Patel's commendation was reported in FICCI's Golden Jubilec Special Supplement 
to the fimes of India (New lDelhi), 23 April 1977, p 1. Patel's power was made 
obvious by his letters, collected and edited by Durga Das, Vol 6, Ahmedahad, 
Navjivan, 1972, p 536. 
7 In all the collective efforls at planning in the pre-independence period in which 
industrialists were included in the planning body, the reports were either agnostic 
or hostile to nationalisation of existing enterprises. These efforts incltlded setting 
up of the Congress' National Planning (:ommittee (appointed in 1938) the 
Reconstruction Committee of the Viceroy's Executise Council (formed in 1941), 
the efforts of the Government of India's Planning and Development Department 
(established in 1944), the "Bombay" or "Tata-Birla" Plan, 1944, and the Advisory 
Planning Board's report, 1947. Significantly, the All India Congress Committee's 
Economic Programmes Committce appointetl in November 1947 had no direct or 
indirect replesentation of big industrial interests It recommended nationali- 
sation in a forthright way, but this line of Lhinking (let alone action) was quickly 
brought o heel l)y the A I C C. 
8 The degree of this power is indicated by the Government of India's apparent 
naivete in asking the industrialists o accept nationalisation, and then retreating to 
some kind of "compromise", leaving the industrialists in full control See the 
44 SOCIAL SCIENTIST 
report of the proceedings of the Conference Otl Industrial Development in India, 
New Delhi, Ministry of Industry and Stlpply, 1948. 
9 One of Asoka Mehta's pamphlets provides a graphic illllstration of the wawr in 
which pro-pubIic sector sentiments were aroused. "The annuai profits of the 
Tata Iron and Steel Company equal the total reventles of the Government of 
Bihar. And it is just one of the I'ata concerns. \/\ie demand deInocratic ontrol 
over the finances of the Government of Bihar. Shall we let the industries remain 
under the unchecked control of their oligarchs?" Qlloted in Wadia and Merchant 
op cit, p 482. By implication any investrnent undertaken by the Government 
actually extended democratic control over the economy as a whole, arsd was not 
merely a pre-requisite for such democratic ontrol. 
10 The Constitution, with all its limitations, is perhaps the best index of this. See 
EwM S Namboodripad, "The Republican Constitution in the Struggle for 
Socialism", in Selected Writings: Vol 1, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1982, 
pp 3 1 6-336. 
1 1 In 19.50, the Fiscal Commission llad stressed the fXlet hat as a source of 
employment to "middle class" people, the socisl importance of small enterprises 
was "out of all proportion to their relative strength in the industrial sector". 
It went on to suggest hat the Government should take special interest in their 
promotion and development. Report of the Fiscal Commission 1949-50, Solume 1, 
New Delhi, Government of India, 1 9i0, p 1 ] 2. With the help of a Ford Foundation 
assisted team, the Government of India established the Office of the Development 
Commissioner for Small Scale Industries (see below), and a network of related 
institutions in 1954. Although the program3zles spoke in terms of small scaie 
enterprises, a senior administrator closely concerned with the programme since its 
inception had made it clear that the concern was with small scale entrepreneurs. 
See the letter written by P C Alexander, then Developnlent Ce mmissioner (Small 
Scale Industries) to all Directorates of Industry and Small Industries Service 
Institutes, quoted ill S K Goyal et al. Small Scale Sector and Big Business: Studies in 
Xational Dezbelopment, Number 2, I\'essr Delhi, IlPA, 1984, p 69. In 1961 C Tylor 
Wood, Economic ASairs Minister in the United States Embassy in l!Tew Delhi 
wrote a "memorandum of conersaticon" to the then U S Arnbassador, 
J K (>,albraith. In it he mentioned a meeting lleld on 20June 1961 in Delhi in 
which discussions were held with Indian oicials who shared his concern that the 
small enterprises development programme "was one of the most cSective means of 
help3ng to develop a pluralistic society and a self reliant middle cIass in India". 
Present at the nleeting were B Venkatappiah, Deputy Governor of the Reserve 
Bank of India, K C Mittra, Borrobax Manager at the RBI, C Erlsminger, Ford 
Foundation Representative in Indiay and Tylor Wood llilnself. (File on Assistance 
to the Indian Small lndustries Dexrelopment Organisatiorz, Office of the Ford 
Foundation, lSTew I)elhi). 
12 For the data and defillitions see, for instance, Census, pnt)e J\rO. ] of 1960: Economic 
Towbles ofReorganised States-1951 Cen.stls, )elhi. Regictrar (:;eneral of Irldia, 1961. 
13 Foraxlelaboratiorlofthispoint,see \'ILellin, "]11 DexelopInentofCapitcllism 
in Russia", Collected works, Xtolunle III Moscom, Progress Publishez, 1960, 
pp 51 .58. 
14 In this case C;overnment policies *sere oriented towards the transfcxrmation of 
foudal landlords into capitalist l,andlorcls, and the (reation of a rich peasal1t 
stratum. Thu3 the bulk of middle peasants axIcl tlle entire poor peasants were 
expeeted to be dispossessed and enter the aglic:lltllral or industrial work force. 
The roots of the crisls in India development lie precisely in this stalegy. 
15 See references given in 7, abovc. 
16 The process of reconciling ;'middle czlass radicalism" zith the strategy favoured 
by the big industrialists was set iII motion by t}le AICC zvhen, following tlle 
strategy mentioned in 7 above, it constituted a corr.mittee cllaired }y JluZaharlal 
SN1ALL ENTERPRISES 
45 
Nehru. This committee was supposed to vork out the detailed implications 
flowing from the Congress Economic l'rogrammes Committee's Report and the 
pronoucedly status quoist Industiral Policy Resolution of 1948. 
17 Ihe distinction between the processes and their interconneetion is analysed in 
K Marx, Capital, Vol 1, Ch 25. 
18 Sce Government of India, Ministry of Ccmmerce and Industry, Report of the 
Working Grotlp on Small Scale Industries: Programme of Work for the Third Five Xear 
Plan, New Delhi, 1960. 
19 The clearest expression of this is the ubiquitous infringement of the policy 
reserving items for exclusive production in the small scale sector by transnational 
and indigenous big enterprises. See S K Goyal, et al, op cit. 
20 A company like Hindustan Lever, for instance, has 4000 retail stockists whose 
turnover varies ftom Rs 25,000 to Rs 2 crors per annum. These stockists upply 
300,000 retailers. In addition, the company has "satellite or van markets" 
which service remote markets, whether from "Patiala in the Punjab or Tiruvalla 
in Kerala". T Thomas, "Distribution of Essential Commodsties", Speech at 
Annual General Meeting of Hindustan Lever Limited, 20 June 1975. 
21 Thomas offers an ingenious rationale for the marketing practices of large corpo- 
rations by arguing that without the investment in sales promotion by these 
corporations, products would lie with reta.il traders longer. These costs of storage 
wotlld then be passed onto the customer through higher margins. T Thomas, 
ot cit. As a matter of fact, heavy advertising expenditure and extensive distribution 
networks serve basically as barriers to entry to competing products. 
22 For exhaustive documentation, see S K Goyal, et al, op cit. 
23 See Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development, Report of the 
C7ommittee for Drafting Legislation for Small Scale Industries, 1972, (Mimeo). 
24 Tn the oRicial definition it is stated that an ancillary unit should not be "a 
subsidiary to or controlled by any large units in regard to the negotiations of 
contracts for supply of its goods to any large unit". Various guidelines to 
regulate the relationship between ancillary and parent unit have been specified. 
25 See, for example, Economic Times (Bombay!, 14 January 1984. 
26 The case concerned a 17trge scale unit, Vindhya Paper Mills vs Union of India, 
Indian Security Press and Gandhi Brothers Private Limited. Vindhya Paper Mills 
had been given a license to produce "speciality papers". Gandhi Brothers, who 
were supplying low grade stamp paper to the Security Press represented to the 
Ministry of Industries that the license could not be used by Vindhya Paper Mills 
to produce high grade starrlp aper, as this was a reserved item. Justice Bharucha 
held that Section 29 B (l) of the IDRA could not be used to reserve items and that 
all orders reserving items for exclusive procluction would have to be vwithdrawn. 
See, Financial Express (Madras), 10 February 1983 
27 The cases of Balsara vs Colgate - Palmolive, and many others, are well known as 
cases where small enterprises face extreme competition in products which 
are supposedly reserved for the small scale sector. However, the crux of the 
problem in this case, as in many others, while never possible to document, is well 
known even to senior officials of the Coverment of India. For instance, a member 
of the staff of Hindustan Lever told the Chief of the Small Enterprises Division ill 
the Planning Commission that his companv welcomed the efforts of the f)ivision to 
set up small soap manufacturing units. For once these units had become established 
and "created a market" for soap, Hindustan Lever would move in, and by under- 
selling the small eIltreprenuer for some time, take over the cost free "market" for 
soap. 
28 Even brief discussions with small ettrepreneurs will produce reactions such as the 
following by a machine tool manufacturer inMadras: "All this talk about growth 
is bunkum! As soon as you try to grow they (the banks and other official agencies 
operating as Organisations) try everything possible to pull you down!" 
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29 A further distinction within the group of "real" small entrepreneurs has to be 
made. The importance of distinguishing between the "huckster" section and the 
"working" section as pointed out by Lenin in the case of the peasantry has to be 
borne in mind. This, as Lenin warned, is a very difficult but a crucial political 
tasls. Lenin's remarks are in his "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dicta- 
torship of the Proletariat", Collected Worksh Sol XXX, Progress Publishers Moscoor, 
1965, p 113. 
